Introduction
Analysing the formative events and evolution of Germany's and Poland's strategic cultures and roles is crucial to an understanding of current German and Polish security and defence policy. Therefore this chapter aims to map the development of each country's strategic culture up until 1999. This will act as a foundation to assess the extent to which new security threats and the evolution of CSDP has made an impact on their strategic cultures. It will also underline each country's role set following the end of the Cold War which provides the background for an assessment of both countries' perceptions of security and defence issues prior to the creation of CSDP. The emphasis will be placed on continuity and change in the post-1989 security environment and how each country had to adapt to the change in security conditions.
For both countries 1989 represented a challenge. In the German case, international expectations of a now-fully sovereign country dramatically altered, while for Poland, the foreign and security elites set about shaping a foreign policy for the newly independent country. Nonetheless it is argued that the new security environment was interpreted through previously formed strategic cultures and preferences. Even in the case of Poland, which had not been independent since 1939, lessons learnt from the past were used to shape the country's perceived roles. Polish and then German strategic cultures and roles will be traced individually starting from their unique historical foundations. Finally their strategic cultures and roles will be compared to see if there is a convergence or divergence between them which might in turn have implications for the development of CSDP.
Poland's strategic culture
This section will first highlight how key historical events were interpreted to produce Poland's current strategic culture. This will then be conceptualised using the framework developed in Chapter 2 before an analysis is made as to how the country's strategic culture and roles at the beginning of the 1990s were adapted to meet the demands of the new security situation and the country's own security requirements.
The historical foundations: independence as sacrosanct
Poland's current strategic culture has developed through the Polish elites' reactions to and interpretations of a number of core events over a two-hundred-year period. There was no 'big bang' to Poland's strategic culture but rather a build-up of various injustices which led to the formulation of the core elements of it. The end of the First Republic (Polish, Ukrainian and Lithuanian Commonwealth) in 1795 represented the first stage of the acquirement of Polish strategic culture. For the Polish elites this represented a 'critical juncture' and from this point onwards they focused their energies upon how to regain the independence they had lost.
1795 clearly acknowledged Poland's unfortunate geographical situation. Sandwiched between the great powers, Polish territory was used as a 'prize' for the victors in a number of great power conflicts. The division of Polish territory between Russia, Austria and Prussia in 1795 largely went unnoticed by the general population.
1 However, 1939 was a different matter. As Prizel (1998: 67) highlights, 'whereas in 1919 the notion of a Polish state was the domain of a minority, 20 years of independence gave the Polish nation a new identity and new confidence. By 1939 there was a deeply felt need across the Polish nation . . . for an independent Polish state'. The invasion of Hitler's Germany and the subsequent division of Poland between the USSR and Germany therefore had a greater impact and served to reinforce the elites' historical memory of 1795. Despite the Poles fighting on the side of the allies, the country failed to regain its independence at the end of the Second World War. This ultimate betrayal by Poland's allies was to have a lasting impact upon Polish strategic culture.
Dmowski's political realism versus Piłsudski's political idealism
In the early-twentieth century, elite attention was still focused upon how best to regain independence. The debate was centred on two individuals who represented the different ends of the political spectrum;
